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Abstract
This  study  aims  to  analyze  the  effect  of  good  corporate  governance  towards
idiosyncratic  risk  as  a  proxy  with  corporate  governance  variable  as  board  size,
independent director, women, firm size, firm performance, and firm age. The object of
this  study uses companies  listed  in  the  Indonesia Stock  Exchange and Philippine
Stock  Exchange  using  agency  theory.  This  study  uses  quantitative  approach  and
multiple linear regression to analyze the data. The target populations of this study are
manufacturing  companies  that  listed  in  Indonesia  Stock  Exchange  and  Philippine
Stock Exchange in 2014-2018 which are equal to 615 and 200 year observations. The
results in Indonesia showed that board size, women, and firm age had negative effect
on  idiosyncratic  risk.  On  the  other  hand,  firm  size  do  not  show  the  effect  on
idiosyncratic  risk  and  firm  performance  had  positive  effect  on  idiosyncratic  risk.
However,  the  results  in  Philippine  showed  that  board  size  had  positive  effect  on
idiosyncratic risk. While, women and firm size do not show the effect on idiosyncratic
risk but firm performance and firm age had negative effect on idiosyncratic risk.
Keywords: good corporate governance, idiosyncratic risk, agency theory.
Abstrak
Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk menganalisis pengaruh dari good corporate governance
terhadap idiosyncratic risk dengan variabel corporate governance, seperti: board size,
independent  director,  women,  firm  size,  firm  performance,  dan  firm  age.  Objek
penelitian  ini  menggunakan  perusahaan  manufaktur  yang  terdaftar  di  Bursa  Efek
Indonesia  dan  Bursa  Efek  Filipina  menggunakan  teori  keagenan.  Penelitian  ini
menggunakan  pendekatan  kuantitatif  dan  metode  regresi  linear  berganda  untuk
menganalisis data. Target populasi dari penelitian ini adalah perusahaan manufaktur
yang terdaftar pada Bursa Efek Indonesia dan Bursa Efek Filipina periode 2014-2018
dengan jumlah 615 dan 200 observasi.  Hasil  penelitian di  Indonesia menunjukkan
bahwa board size, women, dan  firm age  berpengaruh negatif terhadap  idiosyncratic
risk. Di sisi lain, firm size tidak menunjukkan pengaruh terhadap idiosyncratic risk dan
firm  performance  berpengaruh  positif  terhadap  idiosyncratic  risk.  Namun,  hasil
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penelitian  di  Filipina  menunjukkan bahwa  board  size  berpengaruh positif  terhadap
idiosyncratic  risk.  Sedangkan,  women  dan  firm  size  tidak  menunjukkan  pengaruh
terhadap idiosyncratic risk, tetapi firm performance dan firm age berpengaruh negatif
terhadap idiosyncratic risk. 
Kata Kunci: good corporate governance, idiosyncratic risk, teori keagenan. 
INTRODUCTION
The  rigorous  business  competition  encourages  the  company  to  experience
significant developments in regard to performance and risks that the company should
look  out  for  In  this  case,  the  company  should  pay  attention  to  good  corporate
governance with the aim of maximizing shareholder's wealth by paying attention to the
risks  arising  from the  investments.  As for  the  board  of  commissioners  who act  to
monitor the performance of directors in carrying out corporate responsibilities as well
as  protecting  the interests  of  shareholders  to  be  expected by investors  '  return is
achieved.  The role of  this  board of commissioners in  the company is  important  in
which  the  decision  made by  the  board  of  commissioners  cannot  be  changed and
collective collegial. This makes the role of the board of commissioners influential and a
major determiner in making company decisions.
Chong et al.  (2018) found that Board size and Independent  directors had no
effect. Women has a positive effect, Firm size has no effect, ROA and Firm age have a
negative effect. While other studies conducted by Koerniadi et al. (2014) found that
Board size has a negatively influential, Independent director has no effect, Firm size
has a negative effect, ROA has no effect. Zhang et al. (2018) in his research gave
different results that Board size had a negative effect, Independent director had no
effect, Firm size, ROA, and firm age had no effect. Meanwhile, study of Chakraborty et
al.  (2018)  resulted  in  Board  size,  Independent  director,  Women,  and  ROA have
negative effect. Based on the gaps found in the research results above, research on
the influence of good corporate governance is conducted against idiosyncratic risk in
manufacturing companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange and the Philippine
Stock Exchange period 2014-2018.
Effect  of  board  size  towards  idiosyncratic  risk.  Board  size  is  the  number  of
commissioners in a company. Mathew et al. (2016) who also found that board size had
a  negative  effect  on  idiosyncratic  risk.  This  is  related  to  decision  making  in  the
company, where the large number of commissioners, less compromise between the
board  of  commissioners  related  to  the  decision,  while  the  number  of  small
commissioners  tend  to  have  a  big  risk  because  interaction  between  the  board  of
commissioners  can  be  done  easily.  As  a  result,  the  compromise  between
commissioners is getting higher in the company. Singh & Davidson (2003) also argued
that the increasingly large number of the board of commissioners, the function of the
board of commissioners as a monitor in the company became ineffective. In this case
it shows that the larger the number of commissioners, the smaller the risk faced by the
company. H1: Board size is negatively related to idiosyncratic risk.
The influence of independent directors on idiosyncratic risk. Ujiyanto et al. (2007)
argued that independent Commissioners may act as intermediary in disputes between
internal managers and supervise management policies and advise management, so
that  with  independent  commissioners,  the  risk  of  the  company  is  getting  smaller.
Jensen  &  Mecking  (1976)  explained  that  the  larger  the  number  of  independent
commissioners, the smaller the risk of the company as independent commissioners
can supervise and control the actions of the directors. Kilic & Kuzey (2016) found that
independent commissioners had a negative influence on idiosyncratic risk because
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independent  commissioners  could  maintain  a  different  perspective  as  a  control
mechanism against the behavior of a free manager and the number of independent
commissioners that  many would have an impact  on good supervision,  resulting  in
increased corporate performance. In this case, it can be indicated that the larger the
number of independent commissioners, the smaller the risk of the company. Linck et
al.  (2008),  independent  director  has  the  ability,  knowledge,  and  expertise  for  the
company at the same time related to  the emergency decision making, so that  the
Independent Commissioner precisely reduce the risk of the company. H2: Independent
Director has a negative effect on idiosyncratic risk.
The  effect  of  women  on  idiosyncratic  risk.  Women  is  the  number  of  female
commissioners in  the company.  Croson & Gneezy (2009)  stated that the women's
commissioners are more risk-taking than men in making company decisions. In this
problem, it shows that the more the number of female commissioners in the company,
then the  smallest  of  the  company's  risk  because women are  more  acting  as  risk
averse in making decisions. De Cabo et al. (2012) and Dowling et al. (2012) stated
that  the  presence  of  women  leaders  in  investment  decisions  and  corporate
organizational  profiles  indicated  that  women  are  more  at  risk  for  reducing  the
company's  risk.  In  this  case  it  shows  that  the  greater  the  number  of  female
commissioners,  the  smaller  the  risk  facing  the  company  (Adams  &  Funk  2011).
Women's commissioners also reduce the risk of the company because women are
included in the risk averse (avoiding risk) when compared to men in financial decision
making  that  might  affect  the  allocation  of  corporate  resources  (Jianakoplos  &
Bernasek 1998). H3: Women has a negative effect on idiosyncratic risk.
The effect of firm size on idiosyncratic risk. Firm size is the size of the company
that is described by the total assets owned by the company Murhadi (2013) stated that
the size of the company affects negatively the stock return because a small company
tends to have a higher risk than a large company, so that with the high risk high return
concept, the small company has a higher expectation of return from investors. Visic &
Pervan (2012)  states that  large companies are under  the control  of  directors who
pursue their own interests and therefore maximize profits as the goal function of the
company can be replaced with the maximization function of the directors ' interests,
thereby adversely affecting the company's performance. Becker et al. (2010) stated
that  company’s size  has a negative effect  on  company’s  profitability  which means
when the company's size rises, it will be accompanied by a decrease in profitability
variables. This is due to the tradeoff between the economics of scales of the company
with  the  cost  of  the company,  thus impacting  the  profitability  of  the  company that
resulted in the company's risk increases. H4: Firm size has a negative relationship with
idiosyncratic risk.
The effect  of  firm performance  on idiosyncratic  risk.  The  performance of  the
business group is  a  measurement  of  achievement  that  has been achieved by the
business entity indicating a good condition for a certain period. Miller and Bromiley
(1990) instead of Murhadi (2013) said that the lower the performance of the company,
the more likely it is to choose a project at risk with a lower profit estimate than the less
risky project with the higher return expected. Naldi et al. (2007) instead of Becker et al.
(2010) stated that the company's performance and risk of the company had a negative
relationship because entrepreneurship activities within the family company did involve
taking  risks,  but  only  at  a  lower  level  than non-family  enterprises.  This  opinion  is
supported by Schulze et al. (2002) that the family company in general has a formal
monitoring feature that is less leading to internal and external companies, taking risks
in family companies is most likely not to take into account the risks with the heart, lack
of systematic reasons, and inattention to the perspectives and opinions of external
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parties. The lack of systems, monitoring practices, and more formal control  for the
collection  and  analysis  of  systematic  information  resulted  in  a  family  company
investing in the wrong project without considering the pros and cons in terms of risk.
The  logic  shows  that  managers  in  the  company  is  less  of  control  and  the
understanding of the risks taken. Besides, the manager has little pressure to analyses
and motivate alternatives for internal and external stakeholders. In other words, family
companies have a greater  attitude to  allocate  resources based on the  hunch and
opportunities  that  exist  can  only  be  accepted  rationally  with  specific  and  intuitive
criteria  (Carney 2005:  23).  H5:  Firm performance has a  negative relationship  with
idiosyncratic risk. 
The effect of firm age on idiosyncratic risk. Firm age is the difference between
years of observation with the year the company was founded. Agarwal & Gort 1996
stated that the older firm age they can make knowledge, abilities, and skills obsolete
and induce damage to the organization. Aging companies can reflect organizational
rigidity over time. In line with that, there has been a cost increase, slowing growth, an
obsolete asset as well as a declining investment and R&D (Loderer & Waelchli 2009).
Pastor and Veronesi (2003) argue that younger companies tend to be more industry-
oriented and have greater uncertainty about the growth of the company in the future,
so  that  corporate  return  volatility  is  also  greater  because  the  risks  borne  by  the
company are also great. Pastor and Veronesi (2003) argue that younger companies
tend to be more industry-oriented and have greater uncertainty about the growth of the
company in the future, so that corporate return volatility is also greater because the
risks borne by the company are also great.  In  this  case,  the longer  the company
stands, the financial performance of the company precisely decreases because the
company has to spend a greater cost to maintain, maintain, and update the company
assets used for the operation of the company, so it impacts on the increased risk of the
company. H6: Firm age has a negative relationship with idiosyncratic risk.
RESEARCH METHODS
The population in this study is all manufacturing companies in Indonesia and the
Philippines  period  2014-2018,  while  the  samples  used  are  all  manufacturing
companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange and the Philippine Stock Exchange
period  2014-2018  with  sample  criteria:  (1)  the  company  has  complete  financial
statements for the 2014-2018 period, (2) companies have data for all variables, such
as:  total  board  of  commissioners,  independent  commissioners,  number  of  women
commissioners, company size , company performance, and the company's age period
2014-2018,  (3)  companies have data regarding the share price for  the 2014-2018
period as well as dispose of companies that do IPO, delisting, and experiencing stock
suspension  then  the  company  is  discarded.  Based  on  these  criteria  found  the
dependent variable Idiosyncratic Risk with the independent variables of the board size,
independent director, women, and the variable control firm size, ROA, and firm age. 
The data processing methods in this study use panel data with the aim to find out how
the effect of independent variables on the dependent variable. Presentation  of
formulas and information from formulas can be seen below:
Yit = β + β1 Board Sizei,t + β2 INDi,t + β3 Womeni,t + β4 Firm Sizei,t + β5 Firm Performancei,t
+ β6 Firm Agei,t  + εi,t     (1)
Where Y it is the risk to the company i period t, Board Size i,t is number of
commissioners  in  the  company  i  period  t,  IND  i,t  is  number  of  independent
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commissioners in company i period t, Women i,t is number of female commissioners in
company i period t, Firm Performance i,t is performance in the company i period t,
Firm Size i,t is size in company i period t, Firm Age i,t is age at company i period t, α is
constant coefficient, β  is the regression coefficient and e is the error 
RESULT AND DISCUSSIONS
The  presence  of  multicollinearity  in  variable  independent  director  variable
renders the variable discarded. Table 2 and 3 show descriptive statistical results for
Indonesia  and the  Philippines with  each research variable:  board  size,  women as
independent  variables,  firm  size,  ROA,  and  firm  age  as  control  variables  and
idiosyncratic risk as dependent variables.
Table 1. Indonesian Descriptive Statistics
 
IDIO_RIS
K B_SIZE WOMEN F_SIZE ROA F_AGE
 The mean 0.056604 4.242276 0.448780 28,37733 0.039763 40.83252
 Median 0.030787 3,000,000 0.000000 28.34328 0.028980 38.00000
 Maximum 2.161153 13.00000 4.000000 33.47373 0.920997 105.0000
 Minimum 0.000000 2.000000 0.000000 20,20982 -0.548466 5.000000
 Std. Dev 0.147163 1.843600 0.648396 1.841863 0.110303 17,19034
 Skewness 10.02379 1.311931 1.392456 -0.642682 1.184983 1.489779
 Kurtosis 120.5295 5.216127 4,975419 6.306968 15,32426 6.042262
 
 Jarque-Bera 364261.5 302,2693 298.7366 322.5725 4036,045 464.6613
 Probability 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000
 
 Sum 34,81149 2609,000 276.0000 17452.06 24.45453 25112.00
Sum Sq. Dev 13,29741 2086901 258,1366 2082,969 7.470397 181441.7
 
 Observations 615 615 615 615 615 615
Source: Eviews 10, data processed
Table  1  shows  the  descriptive  statistics  of  manufacturing  companies  in
Indonesia with an observation amount of 615. In this study, there are variables in the
form of money that have decimal units, namely idiosyncratic risk as the dependent
variable and board size, women, firm size, ROA, firm age as independent and control
variables. The independent variable board size, independent director, woman have a
unit of people, while the firm size uses the money unit, ROA uses decimal units, and
the firm age uses the unit of year. Idiosyncratic risk has an average of 0.056604 with a
standard deviation of 0. 147163. The Board Size has an average of 4.242276 with a
standard deviation of 1.843600. Women has an average of 0.448780 with a standard
deviation of 0.648396. Firm size has an average of 28,37733 with a standard deviation
of 1.841863. ROA has an average of 0.039763 with a standard deviation of 0.110303.
Firm age has an average of 40.83252 with a standard deviation of 17.19034.    
     
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics of the Philippines
IDIO_RISK B_SIZE WOMEN F_SIZE ROA F_AGE
 The mean 0.036674 6.990000 0.935000 28,82262 -2.446915 40.12500
 Median 0.023351 7.000000 0.000000 28.97295 0.041767 35.00000
 Maximum 0.276202 13.00000 4.000000 32.31994 0.303903 99.00000
 Minimum 0.006387 3,000,000 0.000000 19,96878 -497.6738 3,000,000
 Std. Dev 0.041263 2.071559 1.203335 2.006914 35.19388 23.87382
www.journalmabis.org
5
                                                Journal of Management and Business, Vol 19, No.2 (September 2020)
 Skewness 3.253276 0.764812 1.027079 -0.584004 -14,03575 0.734197
 Kurtosis 14.48255 3,457503 2.808645 4.110610 198.0031 2.643810
 
 Jarque-Bera 1451,534 21,24217 35,46819 21,64748 323452.0 19,02543
 Probability 0.000000 0.000024 0.000000 0.000020 0.000000 0.000074
 
 Sum 7.334770 1398,000 187.0000 5764,524 -489.3830 8025,000
 Sum Sq. Dev 0.338821 853.9800 288.1550 801.5133 246483.2 113421.9
 Observations 200 200 200 200 200 200
Source: Eviews 10, data processed
Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics of the manufacturing company in the
Philippines with an observation amount of 200. In this research, there are variables in
the form of money that have decimal units that are idiosyncratic risk as dependent
variables and board size, women, firm size, ROA, firm age as independent variables
and controls. The independent variable board size, independent director, woman has a
unit of people, while the firm size uses the money unit, ROA uses decimal units, and
the firm age uses the unit of year.  Idiosyncratic risk has an average of 0.036674 with a
standard  deviation  of  0.041263.  Board  size  has  an  average  of  6.990000  with  a
standard deviation of 2.071559 . Women have an average of 0.935000 with a standard
deviation of 1.203335. Firm size has an average of 28,82262 with a standard deviation
of 2.006914. ROA has an average of -2.446915 with a standard deviation of 35.19388.
Firm age has an average of 40.12500 with a standard deviation of 23.87382.
Hypothesis Testing Results. After going through the Chow test and the Hausman
test,  it  is  known  that  the  best  model  is  the  fixed  effect  model.  The  equations  of
regression in  Tables 3 and 4, show idiosyncratic risk as a dependent variable, while
the board size and women as their independent variables and firm sizes, ROA, and
firm age as control variables.
Table 3. Indonesian Regression Test Results
Variable Coefficient t-Statistics Probability Hypothesis
C 0.154942 5.950923 0.0000 ***
B_SIZE -0.005280 -4.613294 0.0000 *** -
WOMEN -0.007003 -4.299163 0.0000 *** -
F_SIZE -0,000814 -0.707679 0.4795 -
ROA 0.018138 7.581633 0.0000 *** +




Source: Eviews 10, data processed
Note : * : significance at 10%
** : significance at 5%
*** : significance at 1%
Idiosyncratic Risk = 0.154942 - 0.005280 B_SIZE - 0.007003 WOMEN - 0.000814 
F_SIZE + 0.018138 ROA - 0.001235 F_AGE
The equation above has a constant value of 0.154942. The value shows that
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Table 4. Philippine Regression Test Results
Variable Coefficient t-Statistics Probability Hypothesis
C 0.071472 3.546985 0.0005
B_SIZE 0.001070 2.253860 0.0256 +
WOMEN -0.001037 -1.464239 0.1452 -
F_SIZE -0,000366 -1.278377 0.2030 -
ROA -9.99E-05 -36.56106 0.0000 -




Source: Eviews 10, data processed
Note : * : significance at 10%                           
** : significance at 5%             
*** : significance at 1%             
                                 Idiosyncratic Risk  = 0.071472 + 0.001070 B_SIZE - 0.001037 WOMEN - 0.000366 F_SIZE -
9.99E-05 ROA - 0.000773 F_AGE
The equation above has a constant of 0.071472. It is significant that when the
variable of independent value- 0, then Idiosyncratic Risk will rise 0.071472.
 
In Table 3, it shows the comparison of research results with research hypotheses
for  Indonesia.  Of  the two independent  variables,  the board size and women have
significant results, while the 3 control variables there are 1 insignificant variables that
are firm size, but 2 other variables are ROA and firm age have significant results. The
Table  4  shows  the  comparison  between  the  research  results  and  the  research
hypothesis for the Philippines. Of the two independent variables, the board size has
significant results and women have insignificant results, while the 3 control variables
there are 1 insignificant variables that are firm size, but 2 other variables are ROA and
firm age have significant results.
Board size is the number of Commissioners in the company. The research result
for Indonesia on Table 3 shows that the board size has a coefficient of -0.005280 with
a significance rate of 0.0000. That is, the board size significantly negatively affects
idiosyncratic risk, the more the number of commissioners in the company, the smaller
the  risk  of  the  company  because  of  coordination  and  cooperation  between
commissioners is  difficult  to  do in decision making.  The results of  this  study were
supported by Mathew et al.  (2016) who also found that board size has a negative
effect  on  idiosyncratic  risk.  It  is  associated  with  decision-making  in  the  company,
where the large number of commissioners, less compromise between the board of
commissioners related to the decision, while the number of small commissioners tend
to have a big risk because interaction between the board of commissioners can be
done easily, so that the compromise between commissioners is getting higher in the
company.  Chakraborty  et  al.  (2018)  states  that  the  board  size  and  idiorisk  have
negative relationship because the larger the board size, the harder it is to influence
and  manipulate  the  decision  as  well  as  the  opinions  between  independent
Commissioners and other board of directors. The results of the study for Indonesia are
in accordance with the initial hypothesis which states that board size has a significant
negative effect on idiosyncratic risk. The results for the Philippines in table indicate that
the board size has a coefficient of 0.001070 with a significance rate of 0.0256. This
means  that  the  board  size  significantly  positively  affects  idiosyncratic  risk  as  the
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greater  number  of  Commissioners  in  the  company causes  the  agency cost  to  be
higher (Yermack 1996, Siddiqui et al. 2013, Singh & Davidson 2003, Truong & Heaney
2013, and Florackis 2008 in Garanina & Kaikova 2015). Furthermore, communication,
coordination, and managerial  control  become more complicated or inefficient which
results in difficult decision making and takes a long time (Yermack 1996 and Eisenberg
et al. 1998 in Garanina & Kaikova 2015). Singh  & Davidson (2003) stated that the
greater the number of Commissioners, the function of the Board of Commissioners as
a monitor in the company became ineffective. The research results for the Philippines
did  not  conform  to  the  initial  hypotheses  stating  that  the  board  size  significantly
negatively affects idiosyncratic risk. 
Women is the number of female commissioners in the company. The result of the
study for Indonesia in table 3 shows that women have a coefficient of -0.007003 with a
significance level of 0.0000. It means that the number of female commissioners has a
significant negative effect on idiosyncratic risk In this case it shows that the greater the
number of female commissioners, the smaller the risk facing the company (Adams &
Funk 2011).  Along with the commissioner of  women, it  can reduce the risk of  the
company for women are included in the risk-averse (to avoid the risk) when compared
to  men  in  the  decision  -making  financially  that  may  affect  the  allocation  of  the
company’s resources (Jianakoplos & Bernasek, 1998). The opinion is supported by
Croson & Gneezy (2009) that women's commissioners more risk than men in making
the  company's  decision.  In  this  term,  it  shows  the  more  the  number  of  female
commissioners in the company, the less the risk of the Company because women act
as risk averse in decision making. De Cabo et al. (2012) and Dowling et al. (2012)
stated that the presence  of women leaders in investment decisions and corporate
organizational  profiles  indicated  that  women  are  more  at  risk  for  reducing  the
company's risk. De Cabo et al. (2012) indicated that when a company or bank takes a
significant or high risk, it is less likely to employ women in the board space because
women are considered to be of insufficient quality in making the risk that a rescue
action may need the company from bankruptcy. This suggests that the presence of
female commissioners can reduce risk because women are more avoiding risks with
the  goal  of  making  strategic  decisions.  Results  of  research  for  Indonesia  in
accordance  with  the  initial  hypothesis  that  women  have  negative  influence  with
idiosyncratic risk. The results of research in the Philippines based on table 4 show that
women have a coefficient of -0.001037 with a significance rate of 0.1452. That is , the
number of female commissioners has no effect on idiosyncratic risk. The results of this
study are in line with Smith et al. (2006) that there is no influence between female
commissioners  and  company  performance  because  the  number  of  female
commissioners is  small  and it  is  rarely  found by female commissioners at  the top
management level (Goddard et al. 2009) said  that the industrial effect related to the
number of female commissioners on company performance depends on the state and
years, for example : in South Korea the trend of low economic growth has been very
prominent in the manufacturing industry since 2010 (Lee et al. 2012). Stagnation for
the whole industry can affect results, so the small number of female commissioners
has no impact on the company's risk. This is similar to the dummy variables in the
study. In line with other research beforehand (Hambrick & Mason 1994, Canella et al.
2008;  Smith et  al.  1994)  stated that  the diversity  of  the top management  team is
reflected  in  heterogeneous  with  respect  to  demographics.  The  existence  of
demographic  diversity  reflects  the  cognitive  diversity  of  top  management  team
members  who  can  influence  the  decision  making  process  related  to  company
performance (Finklestein & Hambrick 1996, Jackson et al. 1991, Pegels et al. 2000a,
b). This indicates that the number of commissioners of women do not have an impact
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on the company because if the companies there are commissioners of women and
men  ,  but  the  number  of  female  commissioners  has  no  impact  on  the  company
because if  in  the  company there  is  a  Commissioner  of  women and men,  but  the
number of Commissioners of men more, then the decision of the Commissioner of
Women will be rejected because the number of Commissioners of minority women and
male commissioners are considered to be more daring The research results for the
Philippines  did  not  conform  to  the  early  hypotheses  stating  that  women  have
significant negative effect on idiosyncratic risk. 
Firm size is the size of the company described through the total  assets.  The
research results for Indonesia in table 3 showed that the firm size has a coefficient of-
0.000366 with a significance rate of 0.4795, whereas for the Philippines in table 4
indicates that  the firm size has a coefficient -0.000366 with  a significance level  of
0.2030.  That  is,  the  size  of  companies  in  Indonesia  and  the  Philippines  has  no
influence  on  idiosyncratic  risk.  This  result  was  backed  by  research  conducted  by
Berggrun et al. (2016), but contrary to research conducted by Murhadi (2013) which
found that the size had a significant negative influence with the return of shares. Helmi
(2008) in Murhadi (2013) proved that the size of the company has no effect on the
return of shares. The company's small assets are not noticed by investors in investing,
but see the company's ability to return investment. Jundan (2012), ASRI  & Suwarta
(2014) also showed that the company's size has no effect on the return of shares.
These results  show that  the magnitude of  a  company's  assets  is  less  effective  in
affecting  the  company's  performance  or  not  even  affecting  the  company's
performance. Companies that have large assets do not guarantee the performance of
the  company  in  gaining  a  big  profit.  Another  logical  explanation  of  the  results  of
insignificant testing suggests that the size of the company when publication of financial
statements is not informative enough and is no longer an investor's concern in making
investment decisions and estimating return on this period of observation. Investors
think that a large company is not always able to provide a large return rate as well as
vice versa, small companies do not close the possibility of providing a high return rate
for its investors. The results are relevant to the research of Muhammad (2010)   in
Berggrun et al. (2016) stating that the size of the company has no effect on the return
of shares, so the size of the company is not related to risk. The results of this study are
supported  by research conducted in  Egypt  where the economy in  Egypt  is  in  the
transition or growth stage, so the size of the company has no impact on the company's
performance.  This  indicates  that  the  company  size  and  risk  have  no  relationship
(Ebaid, 2009).in Murhadi (2013) in Berggrun et al. (2016) The results of the research
for Indonesia and the Philippines did not conform to the early hypotheses stating that
firm size was significantly negative against idiosyncratic risk.
Firm performance is a company performance measured by comparison between
net income and total assets. The research results for Indonesia in table 3 showed that
the firm performance has a coefficient of 0.018138 with a significance of 0.0000. This
means  that  the  company's  performance  has  a  significant  positive  influence  on
idiosyncratic risk. Kurnia (2013) in Berggrun et al. (2016)  in argues, if the company's
performance is poor, then investors will not want to invest in the company because the
company is considered risky and not able to provide optimum return. In this case it
shows that the worse the performance of the company, impact on the company's high
risk. Ganto (2008) expressed the influence of financial performance with the return of
shares in a manufacturing company that shows there is a positive influence on the
company's performance, where the higher the company's performance, the higher the
company return. ULUPUI (2007) stated that the company's performance has a positive
effect  on return shares.  This  opinion is  consistent  with  Modigliani  and Miller  (MM)
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stating that the value of the company is determined by the earnings power of  the
company's assets. This positive result shows that the higher the earnings power, the
higher  the  profit  margin  of  the  company.  This  has  an  impact  on  increasing  the
company's value in terms of stock returns. The research result for Indonesia does not
correspond to the initial hypothesis that the firm performance has a significant negative
effect  on  idiosyncratic  risk.  The  results  of  the  study  for  the  Philippines in  table  4
showed that the firm performance had a coefficient of -9, 99E-05 with a significance
level of 0.0000. That is, the performance of the company has a significant negative
influence on idiosyncratic risk. The results of this study were supported by Miller and
Bromiley (1990) in  Murhadi  (2013) that  the lower the company's  performance,  the
more likely it is to choose a risky project with a lower expected return than the less
risky  project  with  a  higher  expected  return.  This  results  in  companies  with  low
performance having to be associated with a company's risk-related return to get risk-
raising  which  implies  that  firms with  below-average performance will  experience a
decrease in performance when company risks are increased. Bowman (1982) also
argued that the risk-finding undertaken by problematic companies clearly impacted the
increased risk of the company because the problematic company was rooted in poor
corporate performance. (Schulze et al. 2002) that the company's performance had a
negative relationship with the company's risk because in general the family company
had a formal  monitoring feature that  lacked to lead to  the company's internal  and
external, so risk-taking in family companies is most likely not to take into account the
risk  of  being  careful,  lacking  systematic,  impartial  Lack  of  systems,  practice
monitoring,  and  more  formal  control  for  the  collection  and  analysis  of  systematic
information  resulted  in  the  family  companies  investing  in  wrong  projects  without
considering  the  pros  and  cons  in  terms  of  risk.  The  results  of  the  study  for  the
Philippines in accordance with the initial hypothesis stated that firm performance was
significantly negative against idiosyncratic risk.
Firm Age is the age of the company that is calculated since the company was
established. The research results for Indonesia in table 3 showed that the firm age has
a coefficient-0.001235 with a significance rate of 0.0295, while the Philippines in table
4 has a coefficient -0.000773 with a significance rate of 0.0849. That is, the company's
age  in  Indonesia  and  the  Philippines  has  a  significant  negative  influence  on
idiosyncratic  risk.  In  this  case,  the  longer  the  company  stands,  the  financial
performance of the company precisely decreases because the company has to spend
a greater cost to maintain, and update the company assets used for the operation of
the  company,  thus  it  impacts  on  the  increased  risk  of  the  company.  The  older  a
company  is,  it  can  make  knowledge,  skills  obsolete,  and  induce  organizational
damage (Agarwal & Gort 1996 & 2002). Aging firms can reflect organizational rigidity
over  time.  In  line  with  that,  there  has  been  a  cost  increase,  slowing  growth,  an
obsolete asset as well as a declining investment and R&D (Loderer & Waelchli 2009).
The  research  results  for  Indonesia  and  the  Philippines  correspond  to  the  early
hypotheses stating that the firm age has significant negative effect on idiosyncratic
risk.  
The coefficient of determination that is used is the adjusted R 2. The results of
the research in Indonesia has a value of 0.547541, while in the Philippines amounted
to 0.728932 for variable dependent idiosyncratic risk . The coefficient that have here a
sense that changes in variable and idiosyncratic risk can be explained by both the
variable board size, women, firm size, ROA, and firm age amounted to 54.7541%,
while the rest of 46.3333% is explained by variables other not included in this study for
Indonesia. For the Philippines amounted to 72.8932% with the remainder of 28.2222%
is explained by variables other are not included in the study this.
www.journalmabis.org
10
                                                Journal of Management and Business, Vol 19, No.2 (September 2020)
CONCLUSSION
Based on the results of the analysis of 123 companies for Indonesia and 40
companies for the Philippines period of 2014-2018, then the board is simulated that
the boards and women as independent variables and firm sizes, ROA, and firm age as
control variables are significant effect on Idiosyncratic risk. The R2 and adjusted-R2
values for Indonesia are 0.641128 and 0.547541, while the R2 and adjusted-R2 values
for the Philippines are 0.788866 and 0.728932. Thereby it can be concluded that the
dependent  variable  Idiosyncratic  Risk  can  be  explained  well  by  the  independent
variable of the board size, independent director, women, firm size, ROA, and firm age
as the control variable with the results of statistical calculations showing F Indonesia
and the Philippines count is 6.850629 and 13.16210 with a probability of 0.000000 <
0.1.
This research can be used as a reference for further research. The research
also has limitations on the number of variables used, the research period, as well as
selected objects. Therefore, it is expected for subsequent researchers to add to the
variables previously used.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
Feel  free  to  impress  your  gratitude  to  person(s)  that  help  you  in  accomplish  the
research. Please keep the paragraph not more than 200 words.
REFERENCES
Adams, R. & Funk, P. (2011). Beyond the glass ceiling: does gender matter?.  Management
Science, 58(2), 219-235.
Agarwal, R., & M. Gort. (1996). The evolution of markets and entry, exit and survival of firms.
Review of Economics and Statistics, 78, 489-498.
Agarwal, R., & M. Gort. (2002). Firm product life cycles and firm survival. American Economic
Review, 92, 184-190.
Asri, I. A. Y., & Suwarta, I. K. (2014). Pengaruh faktor fundamental dan faktor ekonomi makro
pada return  saham perusahaan consumer  good di  Bursa Efek  Indonesia.  E-Jurnal
Akuntansi, 353-370.
Becker, John R., Fred R. Kaen, Ahmad Etebari, & Hans Baumann. (2010). Employees, firm
size  and  profitabilityin  U.S.  manufacturing  industries.  Investment  Management  and
Financial Innovations, 7(2).
Berggrun, L., Lizarzaburu, E., & Cardona, E. (2016). Idiosyncratic volatility and stock returns:
Evidence from the MILA. Research in International Business and Finance, 37, 422-434.
Bowman, E, H. (1982). Risk seeking by troubled firms. Sloan Management Review, 23(4): 33
– 42.
Carney,  M.  (2005).  Corporate  governance  and  competitive  advantage  in  family-controlled
firms. Entrepreneurship Theory & Practice, 29(3), 249–265.
Chakraborty, A., Gao, L., & Sheikh, S. (2018). Corporate governance and risk in cross-listed
and Canadian only companies. Management Decision.
Chong,  Lee-Lee,  Hway-Boon  Ong,  and  Siow-Hooi  Tan.  (2018).  Corporate  risk-taking  and
performance in  Malaysia:  the effect  of  board composition,  political  connections and
sustainability practices.  Corporate Governance: The International Journal of Business
in Society, 18(4), 635-654.
Croson,  R.  & Gneezy, U.  (2009).  Gender differences in preferences.  Journal of  Economic
Literature, 47(2), 448-474.
De Cabo, R.M., Gimeno, R. & Nieto, M.J. (2012). Maria, gender diversity on European banks’
board of directors. Journal of Business Ethics, 109(2), 145-162.
Dowling,  M.M.  &  Aribi,  Z.A.  (2012).  Female  directors  and  UK  company  acquisitiveness.
International Review of Financial Analysis, 29(3), pp. 79-86.
www.journalmabis.org
11
                                                Journal of Management and Business, Vol 19, No.2 (September 2020)
Eisenberg, T., Sundgren, S., & Wells, T.W. (1998). Larger board size and decreasing firm value
in small firms. Journal of Financial Economics, 48, 35-54.
Finkelstein, S. & Hambrick, D.C. (1996). Strategic Leadership, West, Minneapolis, MN.
Florackis C., (2008). Agency costs and corporate governance mechanisms: evidence for UK
firms. International Journal of Managerial Finance, 4(1), 37–59.
Ganto,  Jullimursyida,  et.  al.  (2008).  Pengaruh  kinerja  keuangan  perusahaan  manufaktur
terhadap return saham di bursa efek Indonesia. Media Riset Akuntansi, Auditing, dan
Informasi, 8(1), 85-96.
Goddard, J., Tavakoli, M. & Wilson, J. O. S. (2009). Sources of variation in firm profitability and
growth. Journal of Business Research, 62, 495-508.
Hambrick, D.C. (1994). Top management groups: a conceptual integration and reconsideration
of the team label, in Shaw, B.M. and Cummings, L. (Eds). Research in Organizational
Behavior, JAI Press, Greenwich, CT, 171-214.
Jackson, S.E., Brett, J.F., Sessa, V.L., Cooper, D.M., Julin, J.A. & Peyronnin, K. (1991). Some
differences  make  a  difference:  individual  dissimilarity  and  group  heterogeneity  as
correlates of recruitment, promotions and turnover. Journal of Applied Psychology, 76,
675-89.
Jianakoplos, N.A. & Bernasek, A. (1998). Are women more risk averse?. Economic Inquiry,
36(4), pp. 620-630.
Jensen, M, C & Meckling, W, H. (1976). Theory of the firm: managerial behavior, agency costs
and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics, 3(4), 305-360.
Kılıç,  M.  &  C.  Kuzey.,  (2016).  The  effect  of  board  gender  diversity  on  firm  performance:
evidence from Turkey. Gender in Management: An International Journal,  31(7), 434 –
455. 
Koerniadi,  Hardjo,  Chandrasekhar  Krishnamurti,  &  Alireza  Tourani-Rad.  (2014).  Corporate
governance and risk-taking in New Zealand. Australian Journal of Management, 39(2),
227-245.
Lee,  M.,  Park,  S.,  Lee,  K.,  Lim,  J.,  Kim,  D.,  Kim,  T.,  Shin,  H.,  Lee,  H.  & Lee,  J.  (2012).
Economic prospect for the second half  year of 2012, Series of Economic Prospect.
Korea Institute of Finance, 2012 (2), 1-129. 
Linck, J.S., Netter, J.M. & Yang, T. (2008), The determinants of board structure.  Journal of
Financial Economics, 87(2), 308-328.
Loderer,  Claudio & Urs Waelchli.  (2009). Firm age and performance.  Journal of Economic
Literature, 30, 20. 
Mathew,  S.,  Ibrahim,  S.,  &  Archbold,  S.  (2016).  Boards  attributes  that  increase firm risk–
evidence from the UK. Corporate Governance, 16(2), 233-258.
Murhadi,  W.  R.  (2013).  Pengaruh  idiosyncratic  risk  dan  likuiditas  saham  terhadap  return
saham. Jurnal Manajemen dan Kewirausahaan, 15(1), 33-40.
Pa´stor, L. & P. Veronesi. (2003). Stock valuation and learning about profitability.  Journal of
Finance, 58, 1749–89.
Pegels,  C.C.,  Song,  Y.I.  &  Yang,  B.  (2000a).  Management  heterogeneity,  competitive
interaction groups, and firm performance. Strategic Management Journal, 21, 911-23.
Pegels,  C.C.,  Song,  Y.I.  &Yang,  B.  (2000b).  The  impact  of  managerial  characteristics  on
strategic assets management capabilities.  Team Performance Management,  12(7/8),
97-106.
Pervan,  M.,  &  Višić,  J.  (2012).  Influence  of  firm  size  on  its  business  success.  Croatian
Operational Research Review, 3(1), 213-223.
Schulze,  W.  S.,  Lubatkin,  M.  H.,  &  Dino,  R.  N.  (2002).  Altruism,  agency  and  the
competitiveness of family firms. Managerial and Decision Economics, 23, 247– 259.
Schulze, W. S., Lubatkin, M. H., & Dino, R. N. (2003). Toward a theory of agency and altruism
in family firms. Journal of Business Venturing, 18, 473–490.
Siddiqui,  M.  F.,  Razzaq,  N.,  Malik,  F.,  &  Gul  S.  (2013).  Internal  Corporate  Governance
Mechanisms and  Agency  Cost:  Evidence  from Large  KSE Listed  Firms.  European
Journal of Business and Management, 5(23), 103–109.
Singh,  M.,  & Davidson,  W.  N.  (2003).  Agency Costs,  Ownership  Structure and Corporate
www.journalmabis.org
12
                                                Journal of Management and Business, Vol 19, No.2 (September 2020)
Governance Mechanism. Journal of Banking and Finance, 27: 793-816. 
Smith, K.G., Smith, K.A., Olian, J.D., Sims, H.P. Jr, O’Bannon, D.P. & Scully, J.A. (1994). Top
management  team  demography  and  process:  the  role  of  social  integration  and
communication. Administrative Science Quarterly, 39, 412-38.
Smith,  N.,  Smith,  V.,  &  Verner,  M.  (2006).  Do  women  in  top  management  affect  firm
performance? A panel study of 2,500 Danish firms. International Journal of productivity
and Performance management, 55(7), 569-593.
Truong, Th. T.,  & Heaney, R. (2013). The determinants of equity agency conflicts between
managers  and  shareholders:  Evidence  from  Australia.  Journal  of  Multinational
Financial Management, 23, 314–326.
Ujiyantho, M. A.,  & Pramuka, B. A. (2007). Mekanisme corporate governance, manajemen
laba dan kinerja keuangan. Simposium Nasional Akuntansi X, 10(6), 1-26.
Ulupui,  I.  G. (2007). Analisis pengaruh rasio likuiditas, leverage, aktivitas, dan profitabilitas
terhadap  return  saham  (studi  pada  perusahaan  makanan  dan  minuman  dengan
kategori industri barang konsumsi di BEJ). Jurnal Ilmiah Akuntansi dan Bisnis.
Yermack, D. (1996). Higher market valuation of companies with a small board of directors.
Journal of Financial Economics, 40(2), 185–211.
Zhang,  Cheng,  Kee  Cheok  Cheong,  &  Rajah  Rasiah.  (2018).  Board  independence,  state
ownership and stock return volatility during Chinese state enterprise reform. Corporate












Vol19, No 2 (2020) 
SEPTEMBER 2020 
DOl: https://doi.org/ 10.24123/jmb.v19i2 
Table of Contents 
Articles 
The Effect of Tourists' Motivations on Cognitive, Affective, and Unique Image of Bali 
Alita Prameswari, ( 1 
Christina Rahardja Honantha, (Facu~ of Business and Economics University of Surabaya Indonesia) 
Dudi Anandya, () 
I0.24123/jmb.v1 9i2.435m( Abstract views: 0 I &;'ifj PDF views: 0 
Analysis of Financial Ratios for Predicting Bankruptcy in SMEs Listed on PEFIIID025 
VitiJ!ia Fina carla F?ettobjaan, (Indonesia) 
I0.24123/jmb.v1 9i2.466m( Abstract views: 0 I &;'ifj PDF views: 0 
Customer Satisfaction as A Result of Combination of Food Display & Quality 
Aditya Nova Putra, (IUL1 4 In~rnational University Lialson Indonesia Indonesia) 
Samuel PO Anant3djaya, (lULl - In~rnational University liaison Indonesia Indonesia) 
Irma M Nawangwulan, (lULl - In~rnational University LiaCson Indonesia Indonesia) 
I0.24123/jmb.v1 9i2.439m( Abstract views: 0 I &;'ifj PDF views: 0 
Financial Distress Prediction in Subfrastructure, Utility and Transportation Sub Sector Service in Indonesia 
Resa Meita Ary Putri, (University of Jember Indonesia) 
Hadi Pararnu, (Universitas Jember Indonesia) 
In tan Nuru/ Awwa/iyah, (Universitas Jember Indonesia) 
I0.24123/jmb.v1 9i2.451 mf Abstract views: 0 I &;'ifj PDF views: 0 
The Effect of Good Corporate Governance Towards Idiosyncratic Risk 
Cintya Yuliana Limantara, (Facu~ of Business and Economics. Universitas Surabaya; Indonesia ) 
Wemer R. Murhad~ (Facu~ of Business and Economics. Universitas Surabaya; Indonesia Indonesia:) 
Liliana lnggrit Wjaya, (Facu~ of Business and Economics. Universitas Surabaya; Indonesia ) 
I0.24123/jmb.v1 9i2.440 m( Abstract views: 0 I &;'ifj PDF views: 0 
PDF 
PDF 
PDF 
PDF 
PDF 
